Preventing Capability Leaks in Secure JavaScript Subsets

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Introduction

Overview

- Ad networks and malicious ads
- Statically verified containment
- Experiment
- Our proposal: Blancura

Ad networks


Publisher
Web Page
Major
Advertising
Network
Syndicated
Advertising
Network
Advertiser
<script>
...
</script>

Ad networks

- Trust?



Malicious ads



Safe advertising

- iframes

Safe advertising

- iframes – *Not very interactive*
  - Can't do this with an iframe



Safe advertising

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- Dynamic enforcement

Safe advertising

- iframes – *Not very interactive*
- Dynamic enforcement – *Slow*

	read	write
Cajita	21%	20%
Valija	1493%	1000%
Microsoft Web Sandbox	1217%	634%

Table: Slowdown on "read" and "write" micro-benchmarks, average of 10 runs.

Safe advertising

- iframes – *Not very interactive*
- Dynamic enforcement – *Slow*
- Static verification

Statically verified containment

- ADsafe, Dojo Secure, and Jacaranda
- Language subset that provides containment
- Each party can statically verify properties

Common properties

- Prevent use of global variables
  - e.g., `document`
- Blacklist dangerous properties
  - e.g., `constructor`
- Ban unverifiable constructs
  - e.g., `eval`
- Provide a library
  - e.g., `ADSAFE.get(foo, bar)` instead of `foo[bar]`

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- How often does this occur?

Methodology

- Focus on ADsafe
- Analyze sites on Alexa US Top 100
  - List slightly modified where appropriate
  - Represent complexity of JavaScript on popular sites
- Emulate ad hosting by injecting ad into each site

Browser instrumentation

```
a.p = b;
```



- Instrumented WebKit
- Tracks points-to relation among JavaScript objects

Suspicious edges

- Label *vetted* and *unvetted* objects



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

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

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

Suspicious edges

- Label *vetted* and *unvetted* objects
- Note *suspicious* edges
  - `String.prototype.evalMe = function() { eval(this); }`



Suspicious edges

- Not all suspicious edges are exploitable

```
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- Manual analysis of suspicious edges pointing to functions

Results

- 59% contained at least one suspicious edge
- Constructed exploits for 37% of the sites
  - Including Twitter, MSN, Microsoft, Apple
- Num. suspicious edges correlates with exploitability



Sample exploit

```
String.prototype.evalMe = function() { eval(this); }
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~~String.prototype.evalMe = function() { eval(this); }~~

```
String.prototype.extractScripts = function() {
    // returns an array of all scripts in this string
    ...
}
String.prototype.evalScripts = function() {
    return this.extractScripts().map(
        function(script) { return eval(script) });
}
```

Possible solutions

- Require careful coding by publisher sites?
- Publisher must tune page to specs of ad network
- Too many restrictions push publishers away
- New problems can creep in at every site update

Blancura

- Change the property blacklist to a whitelist
- Run each guest in separate namespace
- Statically verify that all property accesses use correct namespace identifier
  - Disallowed: `obj.foo = bar;`
  - Allowed: `obj.BLANCURA_GUEST1_foo = bar;`

Blancura

- Add safe built-in properties to namespace

```
String.prototype.BLANCURA_GUEST1_indexOf =
    String.prototype.indexOf;
```

- Idempotent compiler from ADsafe to Blancura
- Strict language subset of ADsafe

Conclusion

- Focused on one approach to safe advertising: statically verified containment
- Analyzed consequences of property blacklisting
- Found that many sites would be vulnerable
- Proposed a fix based on property whitelisting

Thank you!

Subtly dangerous function

```
String.prototype.right = function(n) {
  if (n <= 0) {
    return "";
  } else if (n > String(this).length) {
    return this;
  } else {
    var l = String(this).length;
    return String(this).substring(l, l - n);
  }
}
```